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GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
If an attorney, scholar, or citizen opened the 448th volume of
the U.S. Reports to page 573, she would find herself midway
through a case captioned Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.1
Context would make clear that the case was brought by a
newspaper that wished to report on a criminal trial but was
precluded from doing so when the trial judge closed the
proceedings. 2 The tenor of the analysis would foreshadow that the
newspaper was on its way to a 7-1 victory and a holding that gave
it the access it sought to the judicial proceeding.3 And the tone of
the Court's treatment of the newspaper litigant-coupled with
more sweeping statements about the democracy-enhancing public
service rendered by all similar entities-would suggest strongly
that the newspaper's larger societal role in reporting on these
matters of public concern was an important driving force for the
Court's conclusion. The reader of page 573 would see the Justices
of the Supreme Court "praise[] the media's critical role as
surrogate, cite[ ] its importance to public understanding of the law
and criminal justice, and speculate[ ] that this justified priority
entry and special seating for the valuable institution of the press."4
The press, the Richmond Newspaper Court explains, is the
"chief[ I" source of information to the people5 and contributes
significantly to "public understanding of the rule of law and to
comprehension of the functioning of the entire criminal justice
system."6 Reading the page's passages in isolation, the reader
might well come away with an understanding that the fact that a
newspaper was a party to the case was both constitutionally
relevant and outcome determinative.
But the reader would be wrong. The holding of Richmond
Newspapers is that, for a variety of reasons rooted in the historical
tradition and positive social function of openness,7 all citizens-
including but not limited to the media-have a presumptive First
1 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 RonNell Andersen Jones, U.S. Supreme Court Justices and Press Access, 2012 BYU L.
REV. 1791, 1796.
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Amendment right to attend a criminal trial.8 The language on
page 573, praising the press and speaking to its role in enhancing
democracy and educating the populace, is mere dicta.
This particular brand of dicta-commentary about the unique
role of the press in society and the democratic function that it
serves-is not rare. Indeed, a close examination of cases involving
the press reveals that it is one of the most consistent, defining
characteristics of the U.S. Supreme Court's media law
jurisprudence in the last half century. The Court's opinions in
cases involving the media, while almost uniformly reaching
conclusions based on other grounds, regularly include language
about the constitutional or democratic character, duty, value, or
role of the press-language that could be, but ultimately is not,
significant to the constitutional conclusion reached.
This unusual pattern of excessive dicta arises in part from the
existence of a specific constitutional provision, the Press Clause of
the First Amendment, 9 that on its face could house significant
protection for the media, but that has in fact proven to be a largely
empty vessel-seen, at best, as a constitutional redundancy with
the Speech Clause. 10 For decades, First Amendment scholars have
debated ways in which the Court could or should be convinced to
adopt a substantive position giving the Press Clause some
constitutional teeth. In recent years, particularly in the wake of
the Court's Citizens United opinion," there has been a resurgence
of media law scholarship on the question and renewed advocacy for
meaningful protection for the media as a unique social
institution.1 2 Several scholars have thoughtfully argued that it
8 Id. at 580 ("We hold that the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the
guarantees of the First Amendment; without the freedom to attend such trials, which
people have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and 'of the press
could be eviscerated.'" (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972))).
9 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press" (emphasis added)).
10 See David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 456
(1983) ("[T]he first amendment is often interpreted as if it read 'freedom of speech,
including freedom of the press'.., the Supreme Court has declined to give independent
significance to the phrase 'freedom of the press.' It has refused to give the press any more
protection than an individual enjoys under the speech clause.").
11 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
12 See, e.g., Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025, 1027
(2011) ("[I]n Citizens United... [t]he justices were blowing the dust off of a constitutional
question that the Court had not addressed in thirty years: Does the Press Clause have
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would be both more constitutionally sound and objectively better
as a policy matter for the Court to recognize special press
protection. 13 Others have argued that this approach is historically
unfounded and constitutionally unwarranted. 14 The focus of this
conversation, though, has been on a preferred outcome to the
substantive debates over whether the media should be viewed as
having special rights and whether the Press Clause should be
viewed as having any independent force and meaning.
This Essay steps back from the substantive debates to discuss
the more primary question of the ramifications of a dicta-driven
Press Clause dialogue. It investigates the ways in which the
Court's loose language in this area has detracted from careful
doctrinal development in media law and has created
organizational and operational confusion of constitutional
consequence. It argues that, separate and apart from the
substantive drawbacks that might accompany the Court's failure
to commit to a media-protecting Press Clause position, there are
other large-scale, structural consequences that accompany the
mere practice of such dicta-heavy constitutional imprecision and
that these consequences ought to be seen as disconcerting.
The discussion proceeds in three parts. Part II describes the
longstanding pattern of the U.S. Supreme Court discussing the
press in dicta that ultimately proves unconnected to the
constitutional holding of the case at hand. Part III explores
potential motivations and justifications for this approach and
investigates why the doctrine has emerged in this uniquely dicta-
based form. Part IV discusses the overarching jurisprudential and
constitutional risks produced when the use of dicta predominates
the Court's analysis of any issue, and then highlights the ways in
which these risks are amplified and compounded in the area of
press freedoms, where expressive liberties are at stake and the
threat of chilling communicative behavior is pronounced.
significance separate from the Speech Clause... ?"); Randall P. Bezanson, Whither
Freedom of the Press?, 97 IOwA L. REV. 1259, 1263 (2012) ('The second issue raised by the
Citizens United language is that its conclusion that the free-press guarantee of the First
Amendment affords no greater or different protection to the press is almost offhanded.").
13 See Bezanson, supra note 12, at 1263-70.
14 See generally Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or for the Press as
a Technology? From the Framing to Today, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 459 (2012) (arguing the
historical accuracy of press-as-technology approach).
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II. A JURISPRUDENCE OF DICTA
As a descriptive matter, two separate narratives have collided
to create the unique story of the U.S. Supreme Court's treatment
of the media. First, for what most observers would agree is now at
least a five-decade stretch, the U.S. Supreme Court has neither
given the Press Clause hefty independent significance for the
organized press nor plainly and officially rejected this significance.
Relying heavily on the Speech Clause and delivering holdings that
apply to all speakers, even when the speaker in the particular case
is a media speaker, the Court has dodged the question of whether
the press is constitutionally unique. 15  The Supreme Court's
references to the value of quality reporting, the unique reasons to
protect the media in a democracy, and the virtues of a free press
have all been in language that creates no real, binding law or clear
constitutional precedent.
Second, during this same fifty years, the Court has nevertheless
gone about deciding the foundational cases that define the
boundaries of the journalistic endeavor and dictate the legal
parameters within which the press organizes its work. The cases
containing these dicta are cases that anchor virtually every section
of a media law casebook-including watershed constitutional cases
on questions of libel, rights of privacy, access to courtrooms and
other proceedings, and reporter's privilege. 16 Deciding all of these
critically important cases in a permanent state of dicta-based non-
commitment about the Press Clause has produced opinions that
read in what can only be described as a quirky, incongruous way.
The Supreme Court announces that the media is valuable, that it
is critically important to our democracy, and that it does work that
15 See, e.g., West, supra note 12, at 1028 ("The Supreme Court occasionally offers up
rhetoric on the value of the free press, but it steadfastly refuses to explicitly recognize any
right or protection as emanating solely from the Press Clause.").
16 See, e.g., Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. (Press Enterprise I), 478 U.S. 1, 3 (1986)
(concerning access to preliminary hearings); Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. (Press Enterprise
1), 464 U.S. 501, 503 (1984) (concerning access to voir dire proceedings); Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980) (concerning access to criminal trials);
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 325 (1974) (concerning libel); N.Y. Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (concerning prior restraint on publication);
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667 (1972) (concerning reporter's privilege); Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967) (concerning false light privacy); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964) (concerning libel).
20141
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is deserving of protection. 17 It says the press is a unique check on
government, a critical component of the discussion of public
affairs, and a powerful antidote to abuses of power.18 It tells how
the media keep the public aware and keep elected officials
responsible to those they were selected to serve. 19 And then it
concludes that the case at hand is not squarely about the media or
the protection that the media will receive.
Some prominent examples serve to illustrate the phenomenon. 20
The syllabus to Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart summarizes
its holding without a single reference to press freedom, instead
specifying that the case implicates "freedom of expression," and
that the holding centers on the broad free-speech principle that the
government bears a "heavy burden" of justifying any decision to
impose a prior restraint on speech. 21 The opinion itself, in striking
as unconstitutional a gag order on press coverage of a criminal
trial, likewise emphasizes the non-media-specific scope of the
holding, declaring that "prior restraints on speech and publication
are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First
Amendment rights" 22 and that any "prior restraint on publication"
is "one of the most extraordinary remedies known to our
jurisprudence." 23 Thus, the Court held, the governing rule of law
is that prior restraints are presumptively unconstitutional, even in
the face of other competing constitutional values.24 Nebraska
17 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 717 (Black, J., concurring) ("The Government's
power to censor the press was abolished so that the press would remain forever free to
censure the Government. The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of
government and inform the people."); Richmond Newspapers, 488 U.S. at 572-73 ("Instead
of acquiring information about trials by first hand observation or by word of mouth from
those who attended, people now acquire it chiefly through the print and electronic media.").
18 See, e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) ("The Constitution specifically
selected the press.., to play an important role in the discussion of public affairs. Thus the
press serves and was designed to serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by
governmental officials ... ").
19 See id.; Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) ("[I]n a society in which
each individual has but limited time and resources with which to observe at first hand the
operations of his government, he relies necessarily upon the press to bring to him in
convenient form the facts of those operations.").
20 For a fuller discussion of Supreme Court characterizations of the press and an
investigation of the ways in which these characterizations sometimes conflict with the
Court's own treatment of the media, see generally Jones, supra note 4.
21 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 539 (1976).
22 Id. at 559.
23 Id. at 562.
24 Id. at 570.
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Press Association is, without question, a precedent that guarantees
this freedom from governmental prior restraint regardless of the
character of the restrained speaker, rather than a media-focused
holding about the contours and applicability of the Press Clause.
25
But the opinion in Nebraska Press Association overflows with
media-characterizing-and intensely media-praising-language
that is unnecessary to its speech-rights holding. Indeed, although
the Court itself notes that the majority opinion begins and ends
with the true, all-speakers scope of the doctrinal rule,2
6 it
sandwiches within these statements of clear holding several layers
of admiration for and celebration of the unique work done by the
organized press, much of which cites to similar media-celebrating
dicta from earlier cases that also did not hold that the press
receives unique constitutional protection. The Nebraska Press
Association Court suggests that the damage done by a prior
restraint "can be particularly great" when imposed upon those that
communicate "news and commentary on current events" 27 and that
are fulfilling the valuable "traditional function of bringing news to
the public promptly."28 It praises the media's "impressive record of
service over several centuries," contending that "[t]he press does
not simply publish information about trials but guards against the
miscarriage of justice" by carefully scrutinizing trial participants. 29
The media is characterized as imminently worthy of trust in its
own editorial decisions about how and when to engage in
newsgathering and publication 30 and is depicted as a critically
important social entity that "has always been regarded as the
handmaiden of effective judicial administration."31  In the end,
however, none of this language amounts to anything. It is, at best,
in service of some hard-to-imagine rule that the already
25 The same is true of several other watershed cases involving prior restraints on the
media, none of which ever specified that their holdings were press-specific. See generally,
e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam) (concerning
injunction against newspaper reports); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (concerning
statute suppressing defamatory publication).
26 427 U.S. at 570 ("Our analysis ends as it began . .
27 Id. at 559.
28 Id. at 561.
29 Id. at 560 (quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966)).
30 Id. at 560-61 (quoting Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 259
(1974) (White, J., concurring) (expressing skepticism about "measures that would allow
government to insinuate itself into the editorial rooms of this Nation's press")).
31 Id. at 559-60 (quoting Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 350).
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immensely heavy presumption against prior restraints should
somehow be taken even more seriously when the press is a party.
More likely, it is in service of no legitimate jurisprudential
principle at all. It is pleasant but purposeless dicta.
The pattern repeats itself in the Court's high-profile speech
torts cases involving media parties. In Time, Inc. v. Hill,3 2 a false
light right of privacy case in which the Press Clause was not
invoked and the holding was not media-specific, the Court
nevertheless took the opportunity to speak to the democratic
function served by the media. It stressed that "[a] broadly defined
freedom of the press assures the maintenance of our political
system and an open society."33 Depicting the media as an earnest,
hardworking institution that performs an "indispensable
service... in a free society" and that needs latitude to make some
errors in the course of its important work,3 4 the Court expressed a
deep fear of unnecessarily "saddl[ing] the press" with impossible
burdens of verifying facts with certainty.3 5 Such concern, however,
to the extent that it was media-specific, was dicta to a broader
non-media-specific holding.
Even the landmark New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,36 although
reaching a holding that ultimately proved to have everything to do
with the status of the libel plaintiff and nothing to do with any
Press Clause protection for the media defendant, got to its
watershed holding about the role of "uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open" debate on public matters by way of a formidable
exposition of the power, promise, and purpose of the press in a free
society and the views of the Founders on that matter.37 Quoting
Madison, the opinion asserted that in every state in the Union "the
press has exerted a freedom in canvassing the merits and
measures of public men, of every description," and underscored
that "[o]n this footing the freedom of the press has stood; on this
foundation it yet stands."38 Jefferson is likewise invoked for the
32 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
33 Id. at 389.
34 Id. at 388-89 (quoting James Madison: "Some degree of abuse is inseparable from
the proper use of every thing; and in no instance is this more true than in that of the press."
(quoting 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 571 (1876 ed.))).
35 Id. at 389.
36 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
37 Id. at 270.
ms Id. at 275.
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longstanding proposition that Congress ought not attempt to
"controul [sic] the freedom of the press."39 The case does not, in
the end, invoke an actual Freedom of the Press, but it creates a
bedrock of press-supportive dicta on the way to a press-prevailing
but all-speaker-protecting conclusion.
In other cases, although the Court comes closer to holding that
a case turns on the media character of the party involved because
the particular prohibition at issue was a statutory restraint on
media publication of particular matters, it still has fallen short of
imbuing the Press Clause with unique meaning, thus rendering
the expansive discussions of the unique role and value of the press
dicta. In Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, the core holding of which is
that the distribution of lawfully obtained information cannot
ordinarily be punished consistent with the Speech Clause, 4° the
Court presents that holding in an opinion that repeatedly
references lower-case "freedom of the press" 41 but nowhere
acknowledges any Press Clause requirement of media-specific
rights. The percentage of the opinion's analysis that is occupied
with discussion of the nature, role, and virtues of the press is
substantial: "In the first place," the Court begins, "in a society in
which each individual has but limited time and resources with
which to observe at first hand the operations of his government, he
relies necessarily upon the press to bring to him in convenient
form the facts of those operations."42 The opinion goes on to herald
the "[g]reat responsibility" 43 of the press and to speak of how
fortunate the citizenry is that the media reports fully and
accurately on the proceedings of government, because our
constitutional democracy would disintegrate without it:
Without the information provided by the press most of
us and many of our representatives would be unable to
vote intelligently or to register opinions on the
administration of government generally. With respect
to judicial proceedings in particular, the function of the
press serves to guarantee the fairness of trials and to
39 Id. at 277 (citing an 1804 Letter to Abigail Adams as quoted in Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 522 n.4 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
40 420 U.S. 469, 471, 496-97 (1975).
41 Id. at 497.
42 Id. at 491.
43 Id.
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bring to bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny
upon the administration of justice.44
In other, similar press cases speaking to the constitutional limits
on the publication of truthful information,45 the Court has taken
the same tack-praising the press, sometimes gushingly, and
characterizing its newsgathering role, educational virtues, and
watchdog functions, but never going the distance to hold that the
Press Clause is doing meaningful work in those cases, beyond the
work already done by the Speech Clause. The substantial dialogue
about the media's democratic traits and positive characteristics is
non-binding dicta.
The press-characterizing dicta from the U.S. Supreme Court
have not always been positive and praising-and indeed appear to
have recently taken a decided turn for the negative, 46 with the
Justices' assumptions about and characterizations of the media
moving from appreciative, approving, and even romanticized to
skeptical, critical, and dismissive. Most notably, in Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission,47 a case actually involving
the free-speech rights of a non-media corporation, two opposing
sets of Justices nevertheless engaged in the most prominent
debate in recent years over the specialness, or lack thereof, of the
institutional press. Justice Stevens, dissenting in relevant part,
contended that the organized media have rights separate and
apart from those of other, non-media corporations, and in the
course of making this assertion, he characterized the work done by
these speakers in the press as uniquely valuable in a way that he
said had been recognized since the time of the founding.48 In
contrast, Justice Scalia, concurring with a majority opinion that
found broad Speech Clause rights for corporations regardless of
44 Id. at 492.
45 See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989) ("[W]here a newspaper
publishes truthful information which it has lawfully obtained, punishment may lawfully be
imposed, if at all, only when namely tailored to a state interest of the highest order.");
Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104 (1979) ("If information is lawfully
obtained,... the state may not punish its publication except when necessary to further an
interest more substantial than is present here.").
46 In a forthcoming article, I explore trends in the tone and content of the Court's
characterizations of the press. See RonNell Andersen Jones, What the Supreme Court
Thinks of the Press and Why It Matters, 66 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
47 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
48 Id. at 431 n.57 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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their media status,49 opined that the longstanding protection of the
media was merely evidence of the longstanding tradition of
protecting corporate speakers more generally. He suggested that
members of the organized press served no unique role and scoffed
at the notion that they were deserving of any unique protection of
their own, calling the proposition "passing strange. '50 But again,
these characterizations of the media, its role, and its unique
societal contributions are made when the question of press
freedom is not squarely before the Court, and the depictions are
presented in passing, unconnected to a holding and unmoored in
constitutional jurisprudence.
Time and again, then, the Court describes how the media are
(or are not) special, in an opinion that does not hold that the media
are (or are not) specially protected. Attorneys and scholars are left
with isolated accolades and bold statements of the function and
value of the press that look and feel significant-and indeed have
been cited in briefs,5 1 law review articles, 52 and subsequent judicial
opinions 53 as if they were deeply significant-but by definition are
not.
49 See id. at 342 ('The Court has recognized that First Amendment protection extends to
corporations."); id. at 365 ("[T'he Government may not suppress political speech on the
basis of the speaker's corporate identity.").
50 Id. at 390-91 n.6 (Scalia, J., concurring).
51 See, e.g., Brief for Respondent at 18, Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088 (2012) (No.
11-662) ("As Americans, the First Amendment embodies 'a profound national commitment
to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.'"
(quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964))); Brief for Respondents at 23,
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011) (No. 09-751) ("A broadly defined freedom of the
press assures the maintenance of our political system and an open society." (quoting Time,
Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967))).
52 See, e.g., Lyle W. Denniston, Constitutional Calvinism: The "Sins" of Broadcasting, 54
TEX. L. REV. 1344, 1347 n.10 (1976) (reviewing FRED W. FRIENDLY, THE GOOD Guys, THE
BAD Guys AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1976)); David F. Freedman, Note, Press Passes and
Trespasses: Newsgathering on Private Property, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1298, 1316 (1984)
(relying on dicta from multiple cases); Amy E. Hooper, Investigating Terrorism: The Role of
the First Amendment, 2004 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 2, 3 (same).
53 See, e.g., Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d 282, 287 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Time, Inc.,
385 U.S. at 389, for the proposition that "[a] broadly defined freedom of the press assures
the maintenance of our political system and an open society"); Peavy v. New Times, Inc.,
976 F. Supp. 532, 539 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (quoting Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,
491-92 (1975) that a person "relies necessarily upon the press to bring to him in convenient
form the facts of [government] operations").
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III. POSSIBLE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE PATTERN OF DICTA
There are a number of possible explanations for this
longstanding pattern by the Court of writing dicta that offer a
characterization of the value, role, and uniqueness of the press
without reaching a conclusion that speaks directly to media rights.
One explanation is that the Justices, although ultimately
deciding a case on non-press-related grounds, are nevertheless
sensitive to the facts of the case and feel compelled to remark on
the notable virtues of the litigants before them. Although the
Court has not felt it necessary to do this consistently with other
arguably virtuous or society-serving litigants like schools,
religions, or charitable organizations, it is possible that the Court
feels uniquely driven to do so in the media context. It could
believe that the media's "Fourth Estate" role renders it even more
worthy of praise. The inclusion of the dicta may at least partially
be a nod to a social reality and historical context, as many of these
cases were decided at the height of the institutional media's
popularity and democracy-enhancing prominence. A Supreme
Court operating in the wake of Watergate and its aftermath,
witnessing the rise of truly valuable investigative journalism, 54
and observing the increasing prominence of scholarly notions of
the so-called "watchdog" and "checking 55 functions of the press,
might feel compelled to note that these services were being
rendered by the media. As I have noted elsewhere, 56 a
considerable amount of generalized First Amendment law in the
last generation has come about through litigation funded by
traditional legacy media, and the Court could believe that the
press deserves at least passing mention when it litigates cases
that defend broader free-speech principles.
54 See RonNell Andersen Jones, Rethinking Reporter's Privilege, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1221,
1228-31 (2013) (recounting the history of American investigative reporting and describing
developments in Watergate-era watchdog journalism).
55 Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 521, 606 ('These news sources play a unique role in the checking process because
they sometimes have access to inside information relating to the misconduct of public
officials-information of the highest possible significance under the checking value.").
56 See RonNell Andersen Jones, Litigation, Legislation, and Democracy in a Post-
Newspaper America, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 557, 570-80 (2011) (describing the ways in
which "newspapers and newspaper companies have been at the forefront of major U.S.
Supreme Court battles that recognized far-reaching public rights").
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Alternatively, the Court could believe that the press is in
particular need of aspirational reminders of the role that it is
capable of playing in society, and it could be using the positive
press-characterizing dicta as a reinforcement of what it hopes will
continue. Because the legislature cannot require the press to
behave in these admirable ways or to serve the educational or
watchdog functions that are socially ideal, the Court may be using
its persuasive voice to attempt to bring about those functions, by
praising the media when it witnesses the functions being
performed, even though unwilling to go the distance and
constitutionalize unique protections for the performance of them.
Beyond these practical explanations, dicta may serve quasi-
jurisprudential purposes, even when not directly contributing
doctrine to the jurisprudence. Dicta can serve a signaling
function,57 and the Supreme Court's press-characterizing dicta
could be motivated by a desire to lay down markers and invite
future litigation. Certainly some piece of the explanation for the
dicta about the media is a lingering sense by some of the Justices
that the Press Clause ought to have heft and the media ought to
have special rights. During the relevant time period, at least some
Justices were openly and publicly advocating for a substantive
Press Clause jurisprudence that would afford unique protections to
the media.58 It is possible that some Justices who were supportive
of that notion, and who wanted to leave open the possibility of that
development in the future or wanted to stake out unique
constitutional ground for the press but found themselves unable to
get the right case or the right set of Justices to produce the votes
for that substantive holding, may instead have agreed to join
opinions on the condition that the press-praising portions be
added. As the opinions were circulated and altered to meet the
preferences of all of the joining Justices, the media-praising
language went in but the media-protective holding stayed out.
57 David Klein & Neal Devins, Dicta, Schmicta: Theory Versus Practice in Lower Court
Decision Making, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2021, 2046 (2013) (noting the valuable purpose of
dicta in "clarify[ing] a complicated subject," or signaling a possible future constitutional
challenge).
58 See, e.g., Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1975) ('The
primary purpose of the constitutional guarantee of a free press was a similar one: to create




Commentary about the virtues and role of the press in these
cases, although not representing a holding, could also be argued to
amplify important aspects of the wider holdings reached by the
Court. Viewed generously, it might be suggested that the Court
was merely citing the work of a subset of First Amendment
speakers in order to highlight the virtues of all First Amendment-
protected speech. Under this view, the Court would be discussing
the socially significant contributions of the party at hand (for
example, that the press educates others or that the press
contributes to the flow of democratically valuable information) as
an illustration of the role that all free speech plays in a society (for
example, that all speakers carry the possibility of educating others
or of contributing to information flows). The tone and contours of
the dicta in these cases often suggest that the press is unique and
distinct from other speakers, which undercuts this potential
justification for the press-praising language, but it remains
possible as at least a partial explanation for the phenomenon.
Other explanations for the dicta might focus on the litigation
strategies of the entities bringing the media cases to the Court.
The media bar has largely accepted press-generous language in
the form of dicta, without pushing for it to become a press-specific
constitutional holding, for a number of strategic reasons.
Historically, there was significant concern about the possibility of
any legislative or judicial definitions of the press, which were
thought to smack of licensing and carry the risk of constricting
rather than expanding rights.59  The thinking was that a
specialized doctrine for the press, however positive at its inception,
could ultimately lead to media that are less protected rather than
more protected than the average speaker. 60 More recently, given
the negative signals sent in the dicta, attorneys for journalists and
media companies may have shied away from aggressively asking
59 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Essay, Why We Need a Federal Reporter's Privilege, 34 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 39, 47 (2005) ("The idea of defining of 'licensing' the press ... is anathema to our
constitutional traditions. The Court has never gone down this road, and with good
reason.").
60 See RonNell Anderson Jones, Avalanche or Undue Alarm? An Empirical Study of
Subpoenas Received by the News Media, 93 MINN. L. REV. 585, 603 (2008) (citing historical
evidence that members of the media did not want to lobby for federal shield legislation
because they "worried that inviting governmental regulation would be a tacit recognition of
the government's right to regulate the press in other ways, or that permitting the
government to define 'the press' for purposes of the privilege could lead to further
governmental control or licensing of the press" (citations omitted)).
[Vol. 48:705718
2014] THE DANGERS OF PRESS CLA USE DICTA
the Court for very clear holdings on whether the media have
distinctive Press Clause rights, for fear that the answer will be a
very clear no.
Ultimately, however, the extensive line of press-characterizing
dicta from the Court is a pattern of its own creation and is at least
partially the result of simple jurisprudential imprecision and
sloppiness-a decades-long failure to hone in on the specific
doctrinal question at hand and to act decisively in choosing a
protected entity and the grounds on which it is protected.
Notwithstanding some of the understandable and seemingly
benign or even positive explanations for the practice, the trend is
not without consequences. A set of legal principles built almost
entirely of dicta is fundamentally at odds with basic notions of
constitutional jurisprudence and particularly harmful in an area
that defines communicative rights.
TV. THE DANGERS OF DICTA
When the Court peripherally pontificates with niceties about
the virtues of a deserving media or, more recently, finds itself on a
tangent about why the media is undeserving, using dicta
unmoored to any holding about the actual protection of the press,
it creates two major sets of constitutional concerns. The first set is
common to all exercises of dicta, no matter the substantive topic at
issue. It focuses on the boundaries of the Court's proper role in
articulating and defining legal rules. The second set is distinct to
the communicative context and focuses on the unique harms
created when individuals and entities are not offered clear
statements on expressive freedoms and when the Court fails to
consider the multiplicity of rights implicated by communicative
scenarios.
A. GENERAL DANGERS OF DICTA
The type of dicta that is seen in the Court's press
characterizations is somewhat peculiar. On the one hand, it is
without question that this language about the nature of the media
partakes of the quintessential components of dicta-"[a] judicial
comment made while delivering a judicial opinion... [but]
unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not
719
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
precedential. 61  On the other hand, whereas many traditional
examples of dicta involve the Court speaking in the hypothetical
by discussing facts not before them and thus hinting at an
expansion of the holding beyond the actual facts presented,62 the
press-characterizing dicta does the opposite. The Court is not
taking a narrow holding and using the dicta to illegitimately
broaden it, but instead is issuing a broad holding and using dicta
to hint at special treatment for a narrow subset of the parties
included within that broad holding. That is, the Court in these
cases is not hypothesizing that the press is the party before
them-the party is in fact a media entity-but instead is
hypothesizing that the case could implicate special rights for the
press, which the Court's holding makes clear that it does not. The
primary, central feature of dicta remains prominent: the Court is
speaking through factual and analytical propositions that serve no
role in "justifying the judgment. '63 Like all dicta from the Court,
those press-characterizing dicta are largely defined in the
negative64-they are unnecessary, not controlling, and not the
holding.65
It is this negative definition that renders the press-
characterizing dicta, like all dicta, constitutionally problematic.
The case or controversy requirement of Article III, which sets forth
the confines of the Court's constitutional job description,66 is
ignored when an opinion speaks to matters other than the actual
controversy being resolved in that opinion. 67 Dicta are not given
the precedential weight of holdings precisely because of this
61 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1177 (9th ed. 2009) (defining obiter dictum).
62 See Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1249, 1263 (2006) ("Among the most common manifestations of disguised dictum
occurs where the court ventures beyond the issue in controversy to declare the solution to a
further problem-one that will arise in another case, or in a later phase of the same case.").
63 Id. at 1269.
64 See Judith M. Stinson, Why Dicta Becomes Holding and Why It Matters, 76 BROOK. L.
REV. 219, 220 (2010) ("But most of the debate to date has focused on determining what
qualifies as holding-and therefore by negative inference-what qualifies as dicta.").
65 Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 959
(2005) ("In a case of just one issue and just one logical argument that can take a court from
the facts to the judgment, discussions that do not lie along that path are unnecessary and
are therefore dicter.").
6 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
67 See Phillip M. Kannan, Advisory Opinions by Federal Courts, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 769,
784 (1998) ('The statements that are not necessary to support the decision amount to an
advisory opinion contained within the resolution of a case or controversy.").
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substantial justiciability flaw. The statements involve questions
not directly presented, and therefore the Court is in a poor
practical position to address them well and a poor constitutional
position to address them legitimately.68 Although dicta are
statements about the law, they are not law; "[t]he issues so
addressed remain unadjudicated. 69
As numerous scholars have noted, this ultra vires behavior
presents risks to the accuracy, authority, and legitimacy of the
law.70 Dicta are often less carefully considered and less thoroughly
reasoned than holdings and are, by definition, less accurate
reflections of the state of the law.7 1 The use of dicta "undermines
the rule of law, first by reducing predictability and legal clarity,
and second by inhibiting the emergence of nuanced doctrine."72
Because the Court is speaking to matters unconnected to the
holding, the care that it takes may be diminished.
Beyond this, the use of dicta creates significant difficulties for
lower courts that are seeking guidance from and applying the
doctrine set forth in the Court's opinions.73 A lower court may
have difficulty distinguishing between holding and dicta and,
erring on the side of caution, choose to follow dicta, even though
the language does not have the force and effect of law.7 4 As these
68 See generally Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997 (1994)
(discussing the practical and constitutional difficulties associated with dicta).
69 Leval, supra note 62, at 1274.
70 See generally Stinson, supra note 64 (discussing the difficulty in determining what are
dicta); Leval, supra note 62 (stating how dicta are made to look like a holdings); Dorf, supra
note 68 (noting that dicta are less likely to contain accurate statements of the law).
71 Dorf, supra note 68, at 2000.
72 Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 65, at 1025.
73 See Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial
Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1410 (1995) ("Dicta have useful purposes, but they also
have mischievous potential to cloud the essence of the holding, to promise things in future
cases they cannot deliver, to pressure officials in other branches they cannot control, to
overexplain the writer to the reader.").
74 Dorf, supra note 68, at 2026; see also Leval, supra note 62, at 1274 ("It is sometimes
argued that the lower courts must treat the dicta of the Supreme Court as controlling.
Various reasons are given: Great respect is owed to the Supreme Court; it always sits en
banc, assuring that all of its Justices have participated in whatever it decides; its small
docket means it will not likely hear enough cases to cover any area of law by its holdings.");
Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 65, at 989 (giving examples of lower courts differing on
whether something is holding or dictum); Lisa M. Durham Taylor, Parsing Supreme Court
Dicta to Adjudicate Non-Workplace Harms, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 75 (2008) ("[Mlost courts
agree that lower courts should give some degree of respect to Supreme Court dicta if the
Court dedicated sufficient consideration to such matters. Such courts are careful to note
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other courts "look to the Supreme Court in formulating their own
judicial opinions," "[t]his exacerbates the confusion between
holding and dicta," setting off a potential "ripple effect" of one
court using dicta as holding, and a subsequent court citing that
holding as precedent.7 5
Different choices on this question by various lower courts can
lead to disturbing inconsistencies in the law from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. 76 Indeed, when the Supreme Court fails to define and
distinguish between dicta and holding with precision, it may
enable lower courts to avoid stare decisis by defining portions of
the opinion as dicta or holding, depending on whether the
proposition supports the court's preferred conclusion. 77
All told, the practice of the Court making unnecessary, non-
precedential judicial comments carries with it substantial practical
concerns and is of questionable constitutional validity, no matter
what topic the Court is discussing in the dicta.
B. SPECIFIC DANGERS OF DICTA IN THE REALM OF COMMUNICATIVE
FREEDOMS
The concerns that accompany all uses of dicta are amplified by
additional dangers created when the Court speaks by dicta in
cases involving communicative freedoms, as the press-
characterizing cases do.
One unique problem created when the Court uses dicta to speak
about the potential-but not actual-contours of communicative
freedoms like the right to gather and publish the news is a
problem analogous to the "chilling effect" that the Court itself has
consistently recognized as a grave threat to free expression. When
communicative individuals or entities are not plainly and
unequivocally told the true scope of their constitutional freedoms,
there is a risk that they will underestimate those rights and fail to
that statements made in dicta are not binding in a precedential sense, but are nevertheless
entitled to 'great deference.'" (citing SEC v. Rocklage, 470 F.3d 1, 7 n.3 (1st Cir. 2006))).
75 Stinson, supra note 64, at 221-22.
76 See Kannan, supra note 67, at 785 ("[Judicial advice] introduces instability and
uncertainty in law, both of which are undesirable.").
7 Dorf, supra note 68, at 2004-05; see also Leval, supra note 62, at 1259 ("Stare decisis
requires a court to adhere only to its decision-its holdings .... It thus becomes of great
importance to distinguish between a court's holdings, which become binding law for the
future, and its dicta, which at least in theory do not.").
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contribute in meaningful and protected ways to the marketplace of
ideas, out of fear that they might exceed the unclear boundaries.78
The Supreme Court has consistently said that clarity is a
critically important virtue when defining First Amendment values
and the boundaries of expressive freedoms.7 9 Although the Court
has usually been speaking to its concomitant branches of
government when it has called for this heightened standard of
clarity, the underlying values that it has outlined should be
equally applicable to the guidance the Court gives in its case law
on communicative freedoms. Because freedoms of communication
are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our
society," precision and intelligibility in the governing standard are
essential.80 When statutes govern these behaviors, the Court has
stressed that "government may regulate in the area only with
narrow specificity,"81 lest the regulated communicators "'steer far
wider of the unlawful zone'. . . than [they would] if the boundaries
of the forbidden areas were clearly marked."8 2
Similarly, where the Court itself uses unclear and confusing
dicta in cases that "'abut upon sensitive areas of basic First
Amendment freedoms,' it 'operates to inhibit the exercise of (those)
freedoms.' "83 The same problem of fair notice and the same risk of
inhibiting protected behavior arise from this pattern of speaking
obliquely to unique media roles and characteristics without ever
clearly enunciating a set of unique media rights. Journalists are
making determinations about what behaviors they will engage in
and are ordering their newsgathering decisions around the
guidance they are getting from the Court. When what they receive
78 See, e.g., Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 871-72 (1997) (noting that
lack of clarity in a law that regulates expression "raises special First Amendment concerns
because of its obvious chilling effect on free speech"); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372
(1964) (discussing how potential speakers may "steer far wider of the unlawful zone" when
faced with unclear laws (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958))).
79 See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 217-18 (1975) ("Where First
Amendment freedoms are at stake we have repeatedly emphasized that precision of
drafting and clarity of purpose are essential."); Brown v. Entertm't Merch. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct.
2729, 2743 (2011) (" '[G]overnment may regulate in the area' of First Amendment freedoms
'only with narrow specificity.'" (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963))).
80 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
81 Id.
82 Baggett, 377 U.S. at 372 (quoting Speiser, 357 U.S. at 526).
83 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972) (quoting Baggett, 377 U.S. at 372
and Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 287 (1961), respectively).
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is instead non-guidance, they may well err on the side of less
speech and less newsgathering.
Given that a great deal of the dicta in these press-
characterizing cases is positive, it might seem counterintuitive to
think of the expansive, praising language as creating a chilling
effect. But the delivery of this praise by obvious dicta from the
Court places the media in the same position as a speaker who
might or might not be regulated by a vague law related to speech.
Because the Court in these cases is making clear that its holding is
not press-specific, counsel for a media entity would never dare
read the dicta about the press as creating any actual right to
newsgather or any actual constitutional freedom to meet the goals
that the Court is declaring admirable. Wary of the landscape
created by this unclear language, a responsible attorney would be
cautious and would advise the press that, although the language
might appear to support additional media efforts to achieve those
admirable goals, it in fact offers no such protection. Thus, no
matter how praising, the dicta will not encourage any more
behavior by the press in the exercise of rights beyond those shared
by all speakers. Without ever squarely deciding rights, the Court
is nevertheless affecting rights. The press ought not "be required
to act at [its] peril here, because the free dissemination of ideas
may be the loser."8 4
The excessive use of dicta in First Amendment cases involving
the media is problematic for another reason that is unique to the
substantive area. The pattern of hinting at distinct First
Amendment rights and roles of the press within cases that reach
only broader general holdings about the First Amendment rights
of all speakers has created a systematic failure of the Justices,
scholars, and media law advocates to think with precision about
the specific nature of the rights at stake in a given situation. All
have become so accustomed to this practice of press-praising dicta
in generic speech-protecting opinions that they possess few good
tools for thinking critically about communicative cases that as a
practical matter are, or as a normative matter should be, about the
media and its democracy-enhancing role, as compared to those
that are, or more properly should be, about other sets of First
84 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959).
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Amendment rights and freedoms.8 5  Because the Court is
perpetually throwing this media-congratulatory language into
cases that it then refuses to decide squarely as media cases, it has
removed doctrinal incentives to think about who should be the
focus of the legal analysis in any given communications situation.
A clear resolution of the meaning of the Press Clause, then, could
be expected to have much wider structural benefits for our First
Amendment jurisprudence, and could act as a catalyst for clearer
thinking about a wide range of communications law cases that
have been victims of this mushiness for too long.
I have argued this point recently in a discussion of subpoenas
related to newsgathering and the fickle doctrine of reporter's
privilege,8 6 where the governing case of Branzburg v. Hayes8 7
offers a fine illustration of both the Court's dicta-based linguistic
schizophrenia and the structural sloppiness that emerges when
the Court engages in it.
Both the Branzburg majority, in flatly rejecting a First
Amendment-based journalist privilege to refuse to respond to a
subpoena arising out of newsgathering,88 and the dissent, in
crafting the reporter's privilege test that would ultimately be
widely adopted by circuit courts in cases not on all fours with
Branzburg,8 9 engaged in significant generic cheerleading of the
press. In the forty years since the case was decided, a scholarly
and judicial debate has raged over how that celebratory language
about the press could or should have led to clearer newsgathering
rights and treatment of reporters that is distinct from the
treatment of others who receive subpoenas for information. 90
But-in large part because the dicta is so distracting- the
85 For an excellent discussion of the potential rights that might be occupied exclusively by
those invoking the Press Clause, see West, supra note 12, at 1028-29.
86 Jones, supra note 54, at 1221.
87 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
88 See id. at 681 ("We do not question the significance of free. . . press .. to the country's
welfare."); id. at 704 (describing freedom of the press as a "fundamental personal right"
(quoting Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938))); id. at 707 ("[N]ews gathering is not
without its First Amendment protections ....").
89 Id. at 726-27 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating that a "free press is ... indispensable to
a free society," that the press has aided in "awakening public interest in governmental
affairs," and that it fosters "[e]nlightened choice by an informed citizenry").
90 See, e.g., RonNell Andersen Jones, Media Subpoenas: Impact, Perception, and Legal
Protection in the Changing World of American Journalism, 84 WASH. L. REV. 317, 322 n.14
(2009) (highlighting voluminous scholarship on the reporter's privilege and the treatment of
journalists who receive subpoenas).
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discussion has largely ignored the fact that the dynamic between a
reporter and an anonymous source implicates not only whatever
newsgathering rights are possessed by the reporter but also the
long-recognized and crucially important anonymous speech rights
of the source.91 In other contexts, the Court's anonymous speech
doctrine makes clear that a core expressive freedom is the ability
not to attach one's name to one's expression.92 The Court has
made clear that in some crucial instances, speech will be expressed
either anonymously or not at all, and that it is through the
protection of individuals who wish to remain anonymous that we
protect the wider social goals of free-flowing information. 93 It is at
least possible, then, that reporter or media rights are not the only
rights at play in the confidential source context, and maybe are not
even the most important ones.
These questions-about whose rights are at stake and how
those rights are implicated-are important structural inquiries
and ought to be given careful investigation before the courts assign
a particular communicative situation a constitutional home. The
staggering diversion of language that is press-praising or press-
critiquing but not doctrinally Press-Clause-amplifying has robbed
the judiciary and the relevant litigants of this exactitude and kept
them from approaching like cases in like ways.
A clear Press Clause doctrine that is precise in its contours and
dicta-free in its delivery could also provide this top-level,
structural clarity in other cases in which the media traditionally
have been key litigants. This improved structure might, for
example, help the Court feel fully comfortable in allowing the
Richmond Newspapers holding to just be a holding about openness
of trials for all, and in saving its language about prioritizing mass
media access for subsequent cases in which, questions of priorities
of access or limited seating are actually at issue. Under such a
dicta-free structure, the subsequent case would give institutional
answers separate and apart from the core access question.9
4
91 See Jones, supra note 54, at 1245-46 (noting that uncertain application of the
reporter's privilege has led to confusion among both reporters and sources).
92 Id. at 1249-50 ("Supreme Court justices have stressed both that the Framers
considered a right to speak without identifying oneself to be foundational and that it
continues to be a fundamental right housed within the First Amendment's Speech Clause.").
93 See id. at 1247 (noting that when protection of anonymous sources is uncertain,
reporters and sources will "err on the side of caution" and not report).
94 See discussion supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
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Cases implicating true newsgathering behaviors, true watchdog or
checking functions, or true instances of the press as proxy for or
educator of the wider public could live in their own sphere, and
could properly be the home to expositions of the role of the press in
a democratic society and the need to protect its behaviors in order
to meet constitutionally valuable goals squarely implicated by the
Press Clause. But because we would now be in a world in which
the initial question could be asked-"Is this a Press Clause issue
or is this a Speech Clause issue?"-we would expect more careful
consideration of what rights are actually at stake and for which
parties, and a real rather than passing assessment of the social
and large-scale governance values of both the relevant
communicative institutions and the relevant communicative
individuals.
V. CONCLUSION
Doctrinal non-development by dicta is a pernicious path to
travel and places the Court in the position of acting beyond the
scope of its legitimate constitutional role. It is especially
problematic in areas involving the communicative freedoms of the
press. This is true both because the absence of clarity in the realm
of expressive freedoms may cause speakers to self-censor and
because a lack of clarity in cases that happen to involve the press
can lead the courts to focus on the press as litigants without
considering whether the rights at stake are more sweeping rights
possessed by all speakers or more specific rights that ought to be
possessed exclusively by the media. Declaring that a particular
communicative act-or the work of a particular communicative
entity-is valuable, without actually assigning any constitutional
home to that value, creates a harmful vacuum of rights that
hampers choices and creates barriers to the free flow of societally
important information.
Scholarly conversations about the Press Clause should expand
to recognize that the Court's patterns of tangentially praising or
criticizing the press and opining about its role in a democracy in
cases not squarely reaching a Press Clause holding are
jurisprudentially dangerous. These patterns are harmful not only
because media-protective substance would be better than media-
impairing emptiness, but also because the Court's substitution of
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:705
dicta for doctrine has itself had a negative impact on our overall
precision in dealing with communications issues.
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